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Land tenure security and land transfer markets are once again a topmost priority in the policy de-
velopment agenda because of their expected outcomes in terms of equity and effi ciency in the rural 
sector of China. The policy of rural land rights confi rmation has been implemented since 2010 to 
enhance land tenure security and the transferability of farmland. However, only a few studies have 
been conducted on the effect of rural land rights confi rmation on farmland transfer. Therefore, we 
use household-level survey data from 48 villages across Tianjin City and Shandong Province to 
explore whether rural land rights confi rmation promotes the transfer of farmlands. Our empirical 
results show that rural land rights confi rmation has signifi cant and positive effects on the likelihood 
and amount of transfer-out land at the 5% signifi cance level, but the effect on transfer-in farmland is 
insignifi cant. The results of the study have several policy implications. For instance, the agricultural 
comparative advantage should be improved through various agricultural subsidy policies. Moreo-
ver, the intermediary service network for farmland transfer should be established, and strengthening 
the non-farm employment skills and improving the non-agricultural employment market are neces-
sary for the rural labour force.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s drastically affected the development 
of the Chinese agricultural sector. In particular, the switch from collective farm-
ing to the household responsibility system (HRS) has resulted in an important 
change in the land tenure system. The implementation of this new land tenure 
system led to the rapid growth of agricultural productivity in the early reform 
years (1979–1984), which linked the income of farm households closely to their 
own performance (Fan 1991; Lin 1992). However, the high level of farmland 
fragmentation significantly complicates farming activities. Especially in recent 
years, farmlands have been broken into small land-ownership parcels, and they 
have lost their attractiveness for farming, particularly for the farmers themselves. 
The plots are unprofitable for owner-cultivation because of the small, often scat-
tered, and inconveniently shaped parcels that lead to higher expenditure and 
lower farm productivity (del Corral et al. 2011; Latruffe – Piet 2012). To solve 
these problems, the Chinese government permitted land rentals in the mid-1980s. 
In 1993, the government allowed the extension of land use rights for another 
30 years. Since then, a rural land rental market has emerged. 
According to the statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture, the proportion of 
rural land transfer reached no more than 26% by the end of 2013. The low inci-
dence of land rental transactions can be explained by the type of land tenure and 
other related institutions in China. First, land in rural China is owned commonly, 
and access to its use is guaranteed either by birth or is acquired through marriage; 
thus, the scope of land rental activity is inevitably reduced (Turner et al. 2001). 
In addition, the frequent administrative reallocations of land by the village col-
lective, used to take into account demographic changes, demonstrated their short-
comings in adjusting social relations during and after land acquisition because 
of the problematic land revenue redistribution and forced land acquisitions. All 
of the above factors have resulted in insecure land use rights and in the decrease 
in incentives for farm households to engage in long-term land investment (Feng 
2008). Combined, these institutional features have a constraining effect on the 
development of the land rental market.
To respond to this problem, the government has implemented a series of legal 
land tenure reforms that aim to improve the legal tenure security and transferabil-
ity of farmland since 1998 (Ma et al. 2015). The government therefore provided 
more detailed stipulations in the Rural Land Contract Law (RLCL) of 2002 and 
the Property Law (PL) of 2007. In 2010, the authorities issued their first policy 
document (Central Document No. 1) with the aim of deepening the reform of the 
rural land system. In this document, they guaranteed that farmers would be grant-
ed more property rights, e.g. by accelerating the rural land rights confirmation, 
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and that rural land contract relations would remain unchanged in the long term. 
At the same time, the local governments are obliged to register and certify rural 
land-use rights. In addition, they are required to make the transfer of contracted 
land-use rights to ensure that the transformation policy can be implemented cor-
rectly and in an orderly fashion. In 2013 and 2014, the central government even 
emphasised the acceleration of the afore-mentioned work. In other words, the 
government seeks to promote the transfer of farmland by strengthening the policy 
of rural land rights confirmation (i.e. registration, titling, and certification of rural 
land rights). However, the real effect of the policy is still unknown, and few stud-
ies have focused on this issue.
Secure and easily transferable rights to land have long been identified as a key 
element in bringing high levels of investment and easy access to credit, in fa-
cilitating the reallocation of production factors to maximise allocative efficiency 
in resource use, and in enabling economic diversification and growth (Deinin-
ger – Jin 2006). In many instances, tenure security correlates with participation 
in the land rental market (Gebreselassie 2006; Ghebru – Holden 2008). In fact, 
empirical analysis suggests that insecure rights can reduce the level of activity in 
land rental markets and simultaneously induce market segmentation by limiting 
transactions to a close circle of relatives in which social sanctions can be applied 
to ensure the recovery of land (Deininger – Jin 2005; Wang et al. 2015).
Land registration and titling programmes have been implemented in many 
countries to grant land rights to farmers. In many parts of the world, these land 
registration and titling programmes have led to enhanced tenure security and in-
creased economic gains. In the Dominican Republic, for example, simulations 
suggested that increasing security of tenure could increase the total area rented 
by the poor by 63% and that this would increase security dramatically affecting 
the lives of the poor (Macours et al. 2004). Similarly, in Nicaragua, producers 
who had titles were significantly more likely to rent out their land, thus provid-
ing an opportunity for more effective producers to increase their cultivated areas 
(Deininger et al. 2003). Furthermore, additional findings indicate that rural land 
security conditions produce desirable social outcomes, such as the performance 
of local institutions (Deininger et al. 2003; Deininger – Jin 2006) and even of the 
state (Banerjee – Iyer 2005).
In Africa, land registration and titling programmes have been implemented 
since World War II to improve tenure security. However, these land registration 
and titling initiatives had relatively disappointing results. The failure of these 
programmes to enhance tenure security is largely attributed to their unsuccess-
ful design and implementation (e.g. Deininger et al. 2003; Crewett – Korf 2008). 
Crewett – Korf (2008) argued that the structure of the existing land tenure systems 
in Ethiopia is largely characterised by top-down approaches that do not consider 
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specific local needs. The failure of titling programmes in Africa is well docu-
mented. In most cases, these programmes ignored the premise that they had been 
proven effective (e.g. Peters 2004; Shipton 2009). In particular, many programmes 
were implemented without examining whether the landholders who were sup-
posed to benefit from the titling programmes considered the titles or deeds useful 
and whether they were likely to register transactions after the first registration.
A large number of studies have suggested that renting out land may be consid-
ered a signal to take land away from them because of insecure land rights (Yang 
1997; Holden – Yohannes 2002), or that tenants may not give the land back upon 
the expiry of the lease contract. Furthermore, the level of participation in land 
markets may be sub-optimal. Tenure insecurity of rural land under the HRS in 
China is stimulated by the risk of land expropriation for urban expansion and 
infrastructure development (Tao – Xu 2007). In addition to tenure insecurity, land 
transfer markets continue to be thin. Land transfers that do not violate the con-
tract that farmers signed with the village collective are technically permitted and 
informed by the village leader. Although land rentals increased after the tenure 
reforms in 2002, Deininger – Jin (2009) found that contracts remained informal 
and unwritten, and that these contracts were frequently made with relatives.
As shown above, land registration and titling programmes have been imple-
mented continuously in developing countries all over the world. However, to our 
knowledge, only a few studies have provided empirical estimates on the extent of 
the influence of rural land rights confirmation on farmland transfer in China. The 
objective of this study is to estimate the effect of rural land rights confirmation 
on farmland transfer in rural China. Particularly, we test whether households will 
transfer in/out more land if they are given the rural land contract management 
certificate (RLCMC).
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the history of land 
reform in rural China and reviews the rural land rights confirmation programme. 
Section 3 presents the data and the method used. Section 4 discusses the econo-
metric results of the regression model. Section 5 concludes the study by putting 
the results into context and drawing policy implications.
RURAL LAND REFORM AND LAND RIGHTS CONFIRMATION 
Land policies and interventions that directly or indirectly affect the security of 
property rights to rural land have been a key issue throughout China’s history. 
Before the communist revolution, most Chinese farmers were poor tenants or 
owners of small plots. After the communist government took over, it confiscated 
the large holdings of property owners and distributed land rights to households 
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on an egalitarian basis (Prosterman et al. 1990). In the 1950s, a policy of collec-
tivisation that required farmers to surrender lands to collectives was adopted and 
resulted in disastrous consequences of output and rural welfare, in which millions 
of rural dwellers perished from 1958 to 1960 (Putterman – Skillman 1993; Yao 
1999; Lin – Yang 2000).
To solve these problems and improve productivity, the HRS was introduced 
in the late 1970s, while the communes were dissolved in 1984. The HRS aims to 
extend land-use rights and authorise individual households with income rights. 
Under the HRS, rural land ownerships belong to a village collective, and land use 
rights are allocated among village households. Rural households have held indi-
vidual rights to use the land since the 1980s, although these rights are incomplete. 
Liu et al. (1998) reviewed four aspects of land rights that could vary among Chi-
nese villages: residual income rights, unencumbered use rights, rights to secure 
possession, and transfer rights. As a result of the gradual strengthening of overall 
property rights since the 1980s, residual income rights and unencumbered use 
rights are now universal. 
In contrast to the situation of income rights and use rights, households in many 
areas in China have been reported to have poor land tenure security rights. Land 
tenure security under the HRS is determined primarily by two factors. The first 
is the duration of the lease of land to a household. In the early stages of the HRS, 
land contract period was only one year or two years. However, officials realised 
that such a short contract period offered households poor land tenure security 
and discouraged them from making land-improving investments. Therefore, land 
contract terms under the HRS were extended to 15 years or more (Putterman 
1993; Zhang – Makeham1992).
The second factor influencing land tenure security under the HRS is the peri-
odic reallocation of land by village authorities. Lengthening contract periods did 
not always improve the tenure security of rural households as village leaders in 
many Chinese villages reallocated some or even all of the land using their ad-
ministrative power. The allocation of land based on egalitarian principles serves 
to grant all households in a village collective equal access to vital (equitable) 
land resources that are needed to provide a livelihood. These reassignments of-
ten occurred despite the existence of long-term use right contracts. Studies have 
shown that two-thirds of Chinese villages reallocated land through administra-
tive methods, and that this often occurred in the middle of land contract times 
(He 1995; Brandt et al. 2005). Therefore, the existence of long-term land con-
tracts is usually an insufficient condition to ensure tenure security for agricultural 
households because of administrative reallocations within the period of the HRS 
contracts. In 1984, the government adopted Rural Work Document No. 1, which 
states that land assignments under the HRS should last for at least 15 years. Thus, 
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village leaders should not reassign lands during the contract period. However, 
based on egalitarian principles that serve to grant all households in a village col-
lective equal access to vital (equitable) land resources that are needed to provide 
a livelihood, rural land must be reassigned. Furthermore, the document encour-
aged farmers to transfer land use rights through decentralised land markets and 
discouraged the use of administrative land reallocations (Cheng – Tsang 1995). 
The first Land Administration Law (LAL) was adopted in 1986, and it formally 
introduced the basis of the HRS. Under the LAL, the rights of farmers to lands 
were supposedly secure and extended. However, the original aim of LAL was not 
achieved because of the short lease period and the periodic reallocations of land 
by village authorities (Krusekopf 2002). 
In 1994, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee adopted a resolu-
tion calling for land use contracts to be extended for 30 years when the original 
15-year contracts expired, and this resolution was supported by the law through 
the revision of LAL in 1998. The stipulations in the LAL revision state that land 
certificates should be issued to protect land use rights, that acceptance by two-
thirds of representatives of villagers and approval of higher-level governments 
are needed for land reallocation within villages, and that land transfers to indi-
viduals and units outside the village are obtained with the approval of two-thirds 
of the congress or delegates of villagers (Ho 2001).
In order to strengthen further the rights of farmers to rural land, the Rural 
Land Contracting Law (RLCL) was adopted by the Party’s Standing Committee 
in August 2002 and was made effective in March 2003. The RLCL insists that 
these contracts be written and include, in addition to the names of the parties in-
volved, specific details on location, area, quality, and use of the contracted land, 
the rights and obligations of both parties, the contract term, and the liabilities in 
case of contract violation. To prevent the alteration of contract terms or the uni-
lateral “cancellation” by village leaders if there is need for land (e.g. for indus-
trial projects), contracts are supposed to be registered by the county or provincial 
government that maintains copies that can be called upon in case of loss of the 
original contract or in cases of dispute. The RLCL enables land use rights to be 
exchanged and to be leased, transferred, and assigned to others to a greater extent 
than was possible before. In the case of transfers that leave the original contract-
ing relationship unchanged, the collective has to be notified, but no approval 
is needed. Transactions with a duration longer than one year require a written 
agreement and can be registered by the village on a voluntary basis. In the case 
of reassignment that terminates the original contracting relationship, approval by 
the collective landowner is required.
The Property Law (PL) of 2007 further increased legal land tenure security in 
rural (and urban) areas. Land reallocations within villages are now allowed only 
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in case of a natural disaster or other special circumstances specified by the RLCL 
of 2002. PL implicitly grants farmers perpetual rights, and it states that farmers 
should retain and inherit their rights according to relevant rules when the 30-year 
period has passed. Further legal support of the interests of farmers is provided by 
the Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law, which was 
adopted in 2009, and this law sets out principles related to the use of mediation or 
arbitration to settle land disputes (Ma et al. 2015).
In Central Document No. 1 of 2010, the central state decreed in unusually 
powerful wording that titles be issued to “all rural collective economic organisa-
tions with ownership rights within 3 years”. Toward the deadline, Document No. 
1 of 2013 stipulated that the registration and certification for rural land contract 
management rights should be completed within five years, and further implemen-
tation of this work was mentioned in the Document No. 1 of 2014 of the central 
government. 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
It would be useful to start with a conceptual framework for the relationship be-
tween rural land rights confirmation and the transfer of farmland. Such a frame-
work was first developed in the context of a study on rural Thailand (Yongyuth 
et al. 1988). In his conceptual model linking land titles and productivity in Thai 
agriculture, Yongyuth hypothesised that there are at least three important eco-
nomic relationships to consider: (1) that title can be used as collateral to improve 
access to credit for agricultural investment, (2) that title could increase security of 
tenure for farmers and enhance their willingness to make medium-term to long-
term investments on their land, and (3) that title may stimulate land markets that 
will facilitate the transfer of land resources to the more productive farmers. In 
Thailand, different institutions provide different types of land documents reflect-
ing different levels of tenure security. Three levels of land tenure security, namely 
secure, temporary and insecure, were classified from different types of land titles 
or certificates as follows: (1) Secure land tenure refers to the possession of private 
land with land titles issued by the Department of Lands, including title deed. The 
landowners who hold this certificate possess unrestricted rights of sale, transfer, 
and inheritance. (2) Temporary land tenure refers to the possession of land with 
other forms of land documents issued by respective departments. (3) Insecure 
land tenure refers to the possession of land without recognised documents or with 
only tax payment. These pathways have subsequently been used by economists 
to test for linkages between tenure security, investment, and productivity as well 
as the impact of land markets and other policy instruments.
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We assumed that farmers have more secure land rights by the policy of rural 
land rights confirmation. Moreover, higher tenure security was seen as critical for 
more active rental markets and a vibrant off-farm economy in China (Jin – Dei-
ninger 2009). This conceptual framework of rural land rights confirmation-farm-
land transfer is presented in Figure 1. Different type of farmers, such as farmers 
good at farming and farmers who have worked in the non-agricultural sector, can 
all benefit from the policy of rural land rights confirmation. On the one hand, land 
rights confirmation enhanced the land tenure security; the majority of farmers in 
our survey samples in China believed that land rights confirmation reduced the 
likelihood of a land dispute. More secure land rights and the presence of land 
rights confirmation are often associated with an increased likelihood of making 
certain types of investment, for example, tree planting, fencing, and manuring, 
and it also raised the participation of farmers in land rental markets. Deininger – 
Jin (2006) found that more private transfer rights have a strong positive effect on 
investment and terracing in countrywide sample in Ethiopia. On the other hand, 
before the implementation of rural land rights confirmation, farmers who worked 
off-farm were afraid of renting out their rural land because doing so could be 
perceived as a signal that the land was no longer needed and could be adminis-
tratively reallocated to other households. With the implementation of rural land 
rights confirmation, formal property rights may serve as collateral, thereby al-
lowing a household to access credit markets, which is very important for farmers 
who worked off-farm. 
Figure 1. Rural land rights confirmation and farmland transfer: a conceptual framework
Rural land rights confirmation 
More security for farmers 
who worked in-farm 
More security for farmers 
who worked off-farm 
More demand for land and 
more investment for land 
More supply of land and 
improve access to credit market 
More active rural land rental market 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Model specifi cation and variables
We estimate the following OLS econometric model and empirically test whether 
the policy of rural land rights confirmation promotes the transfer of farmland in 
rural China by applying the household survey data. The structure of our econo-
metric model is
 Yi = c + αi LCi + βi Xi + μi. .     (1)
Formula (1) is the basic model reflecting the effect of rural land rights confir-
mation on farmland transfer.
The dependent variable Yi is the transfer rate of farmland for the household (in-
cluding transfer in and transfer out) (unit: %). The household that transfers in or 
out farmland at least once in 2010–2014 is defined as the transfer-in or transfer-
out household, respectively. If the farmland transfer of a household did not occur 
in 2010–2014, the household is excluded from the sample household. According 
to the research purpose, the transfer rate of farmland for household is divided into 
the transfer rate of farmland for transfer-in household and transfer-out household. 
The transfer rate of farmland for transfer-in household = the transfer-in farmland 
area / (farmland area owned by the transfer-in household at the beginning of the 
year + the transfer-in farmland area). The transfer rate of farmland for transfer-
out household = the transfer-out farmland area/farmland area owned by the trans-
fer-out household at the beginning of the year. Theoretically, a household may 
transfer out farmland first in a particular year and then transfer in farmland in 
subsequent years. However, this kind of household does not exist in our sample.
The variable LCi represents the indicator of land rights confirmation that re-
flects households that can hold RLCMC or those households that cannot. The 
group of variables Xi denotes the other control variables except LCi. αi and βi are 
the coefficients of the variables LCi and Xi, respectively. c is the constant, and μi 
is the error item. 
We select 8 control variables by referring to existing research (Deininger – Jin 
2005; Feng et al. 2010; Mullan et al. 2011; Sitko et al. 2014). These control vari-
ables are the individual and household characteristic variables, such as sex of the 
household head (SH), age of the household head (AH), education of the house-
hold head (EH), per capita farmland endowment (PCFE), ratio of agricultural 
income in family (RAIF), ratio of off-farm labour in family (ROLF), number of 
dependents (NP), and dummy variable. The detailed information of control vari-
ables is as follows.
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As for the households which rent in land, with the growth of age of the house-
hold heads and the increase of agricultural experience, they may be inclined to 
rent in rural land, but when reaching a certain age, with the decline of physical 
fitness and energy, they may prefer to rent in less rural land. Taking the age of 
sample household heads into account, they are generally older, the average age 
is 49.36 years (Table 1), thus the impact of age of rent-in household heads on 
farmland transfer in is expected to be negative. As for the households which rent 
out land, with the increase of the age of the household heads and the increase 
of non-agricultural experience, they may be inclined to rent out rural land, but 
when a certain age is reached, with the decline of physical fitness and energy, 
the income and opportunity of engaging in non-agricultural employment may be 
reduced, and they may not prefer to rent out rural land. Therefore, the impact of 
age of rent-out household heads on farmland transfer is expected to be uncertain. 
The impact of sex and education level of household heads on farmland transfer 
is also expected to be uncertain. Male and well-educated household heads may 
have more opportunities to engage in non-agricultural employment, and thus tend 










Transfer rate of farmland for house-
holds that transfer in farmland 0.58 0.24
Transfer rate of farmland for house-
holds that transfer out farmland 0.67 0.32
Independent variables
SH Sex of household head (male=1, female = 0) 0.726 0.482 0.793 0.514
AH Age of household head 49.36 12.67 46.72 11.43
EH Education level of household head 6.24 2.58 6.57 2.89
LC Whether to hold the RLCMC or not (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.67 0.62 0.73 0.57
PCFE Per capita farmland endowment (mu) 1.26 0.57 1.18 0.46
RAIF Ratio of agricultural income in family 0.73 0.49 0.34 0.17
ROLF Ratio of off-farm labour in family 0.27 0.30 0.53 0.38
NP Number of dependents in family 2.04 1.32 1.98 1.06
Provincial 
dummy
1= Tianjin City; 0= Shandong 
Province 0.51 0.26 0.52 0.19
Notes: 1 hectare = 15 mu.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on household survey data.
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to rent out rural land, but at the same time, they may be more likely to accept the 
new agricultural technology, and thus rent in rural land. 
Household characteristic variables include per capita farmland endowment, 
ratio of agricultural income in family, ratio of off-farm labour in family, and 
number of dependents. As for the households with adequate owned farmland, 
this means that the gap from the optimal operation scale of agricultural land is 
smaller. These kinds of households are more likely to rent in rural land, and vice 
versa. The higher the ratio of off-farm labour in a family, the more farmers tend to 
rent out rural land because the family income is mainly dependent on the source 
of non-farm income. Households with a higher ratio of agricultural income in the 
family may be inclined to rent in rural land. As for the number of dependents, due 
to the number of the non-labour force, the impact of the number of dependents on 
farmland transfer is expected to be uncertain.
The dummy variables for Tianjin City (the sample areas of which are Xiqing 
and Jinghai) and Shandong Province (the sample areas of which are Linqing and 
Guanxian) are included to capture the variation in other factors that systemati-
cally differ between the two provinces. The summary statistics for the variables 
is provided in Table 1.
Data and descriptive statistics
We obtained the data from the rural household surveys conducted in Tianjin City 
and Shandong Province both in East China. We selected two counties from each 
province, three townships from each county, four villages from each township, 
and 20 households in 48 villages from each village. Altogether, we interviewed 
representatives of 960 households that were randomly selected from the list of the 
households provided by the village committees. The interviews were conducted 
in the selected villages during the Chinese Spring Festival in 2015 as part of our 
programme supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.1 
The questionnaire included sections on basic households and individual char-
acteristics and information about the rural land rights certificates. Several sec-
tions of the household survey were designed to collect information about farm-
land transfer and rural land rights confirmation. All of the households were asked 
1  A common problem in the rural household surveys is the absence of migrant household mem-
bers who formally belong to the household according to their rural hukou status. At the same 
time, they are difficult to interview directly because they work away from home. This prob-
lem was minimised in this study as all interviews were conducted during the Spring Festival 
period.
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whether there were any farmland transfers in the village in the previous five years 
and were divided into two categories, namely, transfer in and transfer out. An-
other section of the survey focused on rural land rights confirmation. The house-
holds were asked, for instance, if they had rural land certificates/contracts and 
when they had received these documents. To ensure the high quality of the data 
collected, we removed observations with incomplete information and/or incom-
plete interviews. Our study obtained a total of 854 household questionnaires. The 
distribution of households is provided in Table 2. 
RESULTS 
To investigate more thoroughly the effect of rural land rights confirmation on 
farmland transfer, we used a multivariable linear regression model. The models 
were estimated using Eviews 5.0. The results of the method of ordinary least 
squares estimation are presented in Table 3, which shows that four variables have 
a significant effect on transfer-in land, and six other variables have a significant 
effect on transfer-out land. 
With regard to the effect of rural land rights confirmation on farmland transfer, 
two conclusions can be drawn. 
(1) For the households that transfer in land, rural land rights confirmation has 
no significant effect on the likelihood and amount of transfer-in land, which is 
inconsistent with the findings of Feng (2006) and Ma (2013). The empirical re-
sults of the two earlier studies indicated that a more perfect land contract would 
encourage households to produce, manage, and simultaneously reduce the ex-
ecution cost of the contract of the rural land transfer. Therefore, giving the cer-
tificate of rural land contract management to farmers will urge them to increase 
the likelihood and size of transfer-in land. In our study, the possible reasons for 
the findings have two aspects. First, as indicated by our field investigation, the 






Number % Number % Number %
Tianjin City
Xiqing 112 26.67 110 25.35 222 26.00
Jinghai 102 24.28 114 26.27 216 25.29
Shandong 
Province
Linqing 102 24.28 107 24.65 209 24.47
Guanxian 104 24.77 103 23.73 207 24.24
Total 420 100.00 434 100.00 854 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculation based on household survey data.
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comparative advantage of agriculture is relatively low. Thus, if households that 
demand the transfer in of farmland are still engaged in food agriculture, they will 
not bear the transaction costs of farmland transfer. Second, the transaction costs 
of farmland transfers are relatively high. Existing literature has shown this cir-
cumstance (Jin – Deininger 2009; Kimura et al. 2011). The costs are mainly from 
three aspects based on our survey: the search cost (i.e. the cost for the supply and 
demand sides to search each other’s information), the negotiation cost, and the 
supervision cost for the execution of the farmland transfer contract. 
(2) For households that transfer out land, the empirical results indicate that ru-
ral land rights confirmation has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood 
and amount of transfer-out land. That is, more secure land rights are associated 
with increased farmland transfer out. The plausible explanation for this finding 
is that the households that transferred out land have entered the non-agricultural 
sector. Wage income is the main source of their family, and thus they pay more 
attention to the property income that comes from the farmland assets and do not 
intend to easily transfer out land. However, the confirmation of rural land rights, 
as an effective instrument to improve the security of land tenure, can reduce un-
certainties in the process of farmland transfer out and enhance the confidence 
of the household to obtain the property income from the transferred-out land. 
This conclusion is in accordance with the findings of Deininger et al. (2003) and 
Holden et al. (2007). Their empirical results showed that the improvement of land 
tenure security could decrease the transaction cost of farmland transfer, reduce 
the risk of losing the transfer-out land for households that transfer out land, and 
Table 3. Estimation results of the effect of rural land rights confirmation on farmland transfer
Variable Land transfer-in household Land transfer-out household
Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic
SH −0.027 −1.372 −0.018 −1.251
AH −0.025** −3.726 0.019** 3.405
EH −0.036* 2.014 0.044* 2.273
LC 0.030 1.207 0.028** 2.946
PCFE 0.021*** 4.824 −0.016** −3.513
RAIF 0.004 1.355 −0.007* −2.109
ROLF −0.016 −1.526 0.013** 3.757
NP 0.022** 3.811 −0.026 −1.390
Provincial dummy 0.012 1.076 0.008 1.428
Constant 0.837*** 4.182 0.918*** 5.633
Log likelihood 172.835 124.064
Adjusted R-squared 0.982 0.975
No. of observations 420 434
Notes: * Denotes the 10%, ** the 5%, and *** the 1% significance level, respectively.
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then encourage them to transfer out more farmland. Furthermore, the findings of 
Wang et al. (2015) indicated that possession of land right certificates and fewer 
major land reallocations encouraged households to engage in land renting to non-
family members and that the effects of land right certificates were stronger in 
2008 than in 2000. However, our finding is inconsistent with Lang et al. (2014) 
whose empirical results showed that secure land tenure could stimulate the en-
thusiasm of farmers for land investment, strengthen the “property endowment 
effect” of farmland, and then reduce the amount of transfer-out farmland. 
With regard to the other control variables in Table 3, the age of the household 
head has a negative and significant effect on the transfer rate of farmland for 
transfer-in households, but it has a positive and significant effect on the trans-
fer rate for transfer-out households. The older the transfer-in households are, 
the lower the transfer rate of farmland because the vigour and the age of the 
household head make conducting large-scale farmland management difficult. 
However, for the transfer-out households, as household heads grow older, their 
labour abilities gradually weaken. Thus, the family income comes mainly from 
the children of the household heads, and the likelihood of transferring-out more 
land is higher for them. This finding is consistent with that of Ma et al. (2015). 
The coefficient of education of household heads is significant at the 10% level in 
the two models, and thus the signs of the two estimated coefficients are opposite. 
Table 3 shows that the households with a higher level of education are likely 
to transfer out more land, whereas the opposite is true for the households that 
transfer in land. One implication is that the opportunity to engage in non-farm 
activities increases with education, and therefore households transfer out land to 
substitute their time away from agricultural production. This finding corrobo-
rates those of Deininger et al. (2003), Teklu – Lemi (2004), and Swinnen et al. 
(2006), but refutes those of Tikabo – Holden (2004) and Masterson (2007), who 
noted that the education of farmers had either a negative effect on land transfer 
out or a positive effect on land transfer in, implying imperfection in the market 
for human capital. By contrast, Vranken – Swinnen (2006) noted that education 
significantly reduced the demand for transfer-in land in Hungary; this finding 
was also observed in our study. 
Among the household characteristic variables, the coefficient of per capita 
farmland endowment is significant at the 1% and 5% level in the two models. 
However, the sign of the coefficient estimation is opposite, indicating that a cy-
clic cumulative effect exists on farmland transfer. That is, households rich in 
initial per capita farmland endowment have a stronger desire to transfer in more 
farmland, while households with lower initial farmland endowment are likely to 
transfer out farmland. Several reasons can explain this finding. First, scale man-
agement is unfavourable for households with inadequate owned farmland. This 
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kind of household has restricted agricultural productivity, but increased costs of 
agricultural investment. Second, the ratio of agricultural income in a family has 
significant and negative effects on the transfer-out model, implying that house-
holds with a high share of agricultural income are unlikely to transfer out land 
to others. This finding corroborates the study of Kung (2002), who noted that 
households with active participation in the off-farm labour market transfer out 
more land in China. The ratio of off-farm labour in a family has a positive and 
significant effect on the transfer-out model, whereas, the number of dependents in 
a family has a positive and significant effect on the transfer-in model. 
CONCLUSION
This study examines the effects of rural land confirmation on the transfer of farm-
land from the perspective of transfer-in and transfer-out households. Data from 
rural household surveys conducted in Tianjin City and in the northwest of Shan-
dong Province in 2015. Our findings show that rural land rights confirmation has 
a significant and positive effect on the likelihood and amount of transfer-out land 
at the 5% significance level, but its effect on transfer-in land is insignificant. 
Several implications for policy can be drawn from the above. First, in order 
to strengthen the farmers’ expectations of land transfer, the structure and func-
tions of rural land rights should be further improved, and land contract rights and 
land management rights should be clearly defined. In addition, the policy should 
aim at developing land contractual management rights mortgage and loan, as this 
would break the restriction in which the land in rural areas could not be used as 
collateral. 
Second, to improve agricultural comparative advantages, government policy 
should pay more attention to further increasing the intensity of agricultural sub-
sidies for farmland scale management. The agricultural subsidies should be paid 
to practical agricultural land managers such as grain growers, and it should be 
decoupled from the rural land contractual relationship. 
Finally, to strengthen non-agricultural employment skills, especially for house-
holds that transfer out land, multiple levels of a vocational skills training system 
for farmers should be established. Through the training system, necessary con-
ditions and effective space for the transfer of farmland can be created. The key 
principle is to reduce the reliance of farmers on land as a source of social security. 
Basic social services for households that engage in non-agricultural employment 
in urban areas should be established and let hukou system return to the function 
of household registration and statistics. Furthermore, medical insurance and other 
social insurance systems should be expanded and improved in rural areas.
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